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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ADVENT OF GAY RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Recognition of rights based on sexual orientation (referred to 
interchangeably as “gay rights”) is a fairly new phenomenon in the 
European Union (EU). Before the Treaty of Amsterdam1—
specifically, article 13—sexual orientation protection had never 
been expressly mentioned in EU law. Article 13 makes it clear that 
sexual orientation discrimination—among others, such as race, sex, 
and religion—would be combated.”2 During the development of 
gay rights generally in the EU, there have been three legislative 
texts and resolutions aimed at combating sexual orientation 
discrimination. These texts are: the European Parliament 
Resolution (hereinafter “Resolution”),3 article 13 in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter 
“Charter of Rights”),4 which were recognized or passed in 1994, 
1997, and 2000, respectively. 
 1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (First mention 
of sexual orientation discrimination in EU law). 
 2. Presently art. 19 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, formerly art. 13 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Article 19 (1) provides:  
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the 
limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, 
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure 
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 3. European Parliament, Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and 
Lesbians in the EC, 1994 O.J. (C 61/40) [hereinafter Resolution]. 
 4. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 
83/02 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union 
[hereinafter TEU] created the article of fundamental rights—European Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. This article is binding as long as EU Member 
States and EU institutions are applying Union law. This Charter was actually 
passed in 2000, and would have been modified in the failed 2004 European 
Constitution. Thus, its legal force was in the balance until it was successfully 
implemented in the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in December 2007, came into force 
in December 2009). 
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The 1994 Resolution asked Member States5 to provide gays 
and lesbians with legal protection. The Resolution recognized that 
gays and lesbians should be treated equally with their heterosexual 
counterparts. The Resolution affirmatively called for the de-
criminalization of homosexuality and also sought to protect sexual 
orientation minorities in the areas of inheritance, social security, 
and housing.6 Notwithstanding the Resolution’s non-binding 
effect, it was noteworthy as it explicitly recognized the rights of 
sexual orientation minorities in the EU. Consequently, due to the 
Resolution’s non-binding effect, EU Member States citizens could 
not rely upon the Resolution in court.7 Nevertheless, the European 
Parliament reaffirmed the 1994 Resolution in 1996,8 just before the 
Treaty of Amsterdam was signed.  
On October 2, 1997, the then fifteen Member States signed the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which went into effect in 1999.9 Before this 
provision, there was an unanswered question as to whether the EU 
was competent to enact anti-discrimination laws to protect sexual 
orientation minorities.10 One of the effects of the implementation 
of article 13 in the Treaty of Amsterdam was that the above 
question was answered in the affirmative.11 The article 13 
provision forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation 
was also vital in leading the way for other anti-discrimination 
laws.12  
 5. See discussion infra Part IV. Member States of the EU are countries that 
have relinquished some national power to the European Union. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. See Resolution of the Respect of Equal Rights in the European Union, 
1996 O.J. (C 320).  
 9. The 15 Member States were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 10. Dimitry Kochenove, Gay Rights in the EU: A Long Way Forward for 
the Union of 27, 3 CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. AND POL’Y 469 (2007).  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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On December 7, 2000—shortly after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
went into effect—the Charter of Rights was signed.13 The non-
discrimination clause of the Charter of Rights forbade 
discrimination on many grounds, including sexual orientation.14 
However, the Charter of Rights was ineffective and lacked legal 
force until December 1, 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon,15 in 
which it was incorporated, took effect. 
Outside the EU, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter “the Convention”)16 was promulgated by the Council 
of Europe,17 which is comprised of 47 countries including all EU 
Member States. The Convention was originally enacted in 1950, 
and has been amended several times to encompass a wider array of 
human rights issues.18 Even though the Convention pre-dates the 
establishment of the EU, every EU Member State has ratified the 
Convention.19 The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
“ECHR”) was created to ensure compliance with the Convention.20 
Any person who believes that a state party to the Convention has 
violated their rights under the Convention can file a complaint to 
 13. Charter of Rights, supra note 4. 
 14. Charter of Rights, supra note 4, art. 21. The Charter is comprehensive 
and forbids discrimination based on “race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth right, disability age, and sexual orientation.” 
 15. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 
306)1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 16. European Convention on Human Rights (formerly, Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,) Nov. 4, 1950, 
Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 17. The Council of Europe was founded on May 5, 1949, as a political 
institution. The Council of Europe has promulgated a plethora of conventions. 
The Most important of these is the European Convention of Human Rights.  
 18. The Convention covers, among others: (art. 1) right to life, (art.11) 
freedom of association, (art. 14) freedom from discrimination, (art. 12) right to 
marriage. The amendments made through additional protocols further expand 
the rights granted: E.g. Protocol 12 (art. 1), prohibition of discrimination, 
Protocol 13 (art. 1) abolition of the death penalty. 
 19. EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/ 
dictionary/definitions/europeanconventionfortheprotectionofhumanrightsandfun
damentalfreedoms.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).  
 20. The Convention, supra note 16, art. 19. 
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the ECHR.21 Likewise, a High Contracting Party may file a 
complaint to the ECHR against another High Contracting Party for 
a violation of the Convention.22 All of the court’s decisions are 
binding.23 Nonetheless, the relevant provision on the prohibition of 
discrimination fails to mention sexual orientation.24 
The gradual development of EU powers lead to much stronger 
anti-discrimination laws. In 2000, the Council unanimously passed 
the Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation 
(hereinafter “Directive”).25 The goal of the Directive is stated in 
article 1: “The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general 
framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards 
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in 
the Member States the principle of equal treatment.”26 There is no 
doubt that earlier attempts were insufficient to combat sexual 
orientation discrimination. The Directive can be considered a 
 21. The Convention, supra note 16, art. 34: 
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.  
 22. The Convention, supra note 16, art. 33. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See The Convention, supra note 16, art. 14: “sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status”; see also Protocol 12, art. 1, 
para. 1. covers: “sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other statutes” & para. 2: “No one shall be discriminated against by any public 
authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.” 
 25. Council Directive 2000/78/EC Establishing a General Framework for 
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303/16) 
[hereinafter Directive]. A directive is binding upon the Member States or group 
of Member States to which it is addressed to. This Directive was addressed to all 
Member States. A directive is specific as to the results that should be achieved. 
Directives work to secure uniformity among the EU Member States. Although it 
is binding, the form or method of implementation are left at the discretion of the 
Member States, as long as the objective of the Directive are transposed into 
national law before the deadline for implementation.  
 26. Directive, supra note 25, art. 1. 
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beacon of hope in sexual orientation anti-discrimination law 
because it specifically banned sexual orientation discrimination in 
the workplace.27  
Although there is a plethora of issues that arises in the context 
of sexual orientation discrimination in the EU workplace, this 
essay focuses on the rights of EU citizens—in registered same-sex 
partnerships—to recover employment benefits. Civil statuses, such 
as registered same-sex partnerships, are within the competence of 
the individual Member States.28 Nevertheless, as the rejection of 
employment benefits is not the only issue faced by sexual 
orientation minorities in the EU workplace, this essay also delves 
into the effects of the Directive in other employment areas. This 
essay also shows that, to a certain degree, the efforts to strengthen 
protection of sexual orientation minorities in the EU workplace are 
hindered by the interaction of EU law with the national laws of the 
Member States.  
Following the brief introduction in Part I, Part II discusses the 
scope of the Directive. Part III focuses on the EU courts 
interpretation of the Directive in three seminal cases. Part IV 
contains an analysis of the court rulings and a survey of the effects 
of the Directive. Part V sets forth novel recommendations to 
improve the equality of sexual orientation minorities in the EU 
workplace. Finally, Part VI is a brief conclusion.  
II. SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE 
A. Content of the Equal Treatment Directive 
As mentioned above, the Directive lays down “a general 
framework for combatting discrimination” on the grounds 
covered.29 The Directive covers both direct and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs “where one person is 
 27. Id.  
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See supra note 26. 
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treated less [favorably] than another is, has been or would be 
treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to 
. . . .”30 Likewise, indirect discrimination occurs where an 
“apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular 
disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons.”31 Unlike 
direct discrimination, there are few exceptions made in the context 
of indirect discrimination. For instance, indirect discrimination is 
acceptable if the criterion used is “objectively justified.”32 Lastly, 
the Directive covers harassment, which is defined as an “unwanted 
conduct related to any grounds . . . with the purpose of violating 
the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”33 Furthermore, 
unlike the direct and indirect discrimination provisions, the 
Directive allows Member States to define harassment in 
accordance with their national law.34 Although the Directive is a 
beacon of hope, it nevertheless has some defects.35 
 30. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 2. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Directive, supra note 25, art. 2 (b)(i)-(ii): 
For the purposes of paragraph 1: 
 . . .  
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a 
particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a 
particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with 
other persons unless: 
(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary, or 
(ii) as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any 
person or organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under 
national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the 
principles contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages 
entailed by such provision, criterion or practice. 
 33. Directive, supra note 25, art. 2(3). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See discussion infra Part III. See also Directive, supra note 25, art. 2. In 
defining types of discrimination, among other things, definitions of 
discrimination, harassment are too limited. 
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B. Scope of the Equal Treatment Directive  
Along with the force in employment and occupation, the 
Directive covers vocational training and employer/employee 
organizational memberships.36 The Directive is applicable to both 
private and public sectors, including public entities. The Directive 
encompasses dismissals, pay,37 working conditions, and access to 
employment.38 The Member States may provide for a more 
heightened level of protection, but the Council, when drafting 
Directives, sets forth minimum requirements, which Member 
States must follow.39 The Directive does not cover “payment of 
any kind made by state scheme or similar, including state social 
security or social protection schemes.”40 Member States are 
allowed to opt out of the Directive’s provision on age and 
disability as it relates to their armed forces.41 Article 10 imposes 
remedies for individuals in national court (the referring court). 
Furthermore, in a suit based on the Directive, the burden of proof 
is placed upon the defendant to prove the absence of an unlawful 
discrimination.42 Currently, all 28 Member States have 
implemented the Directive into national law. By December 2, 
2003—the deadline for the implementation—all of the “old 
 36. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3. 
 37. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(c) (This essay explores, among other 
issues, whether Directive art. 3(1)(c) is applicable to the parties’ claims, or 
whether art. 3(3)—relating to social security or state schemes—would exclude 
the coverage of the Directive).  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(3).  
 41. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(4). 
 42. Directive, supra note 25, art. 10: 
1. Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in 
accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when 
persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of 
equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or 
other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that 
there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the 
respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of 
equal treatment. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Member States from introducing rules 
of evidence, which are more [favorable] to plaintiffs. 
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Member States,” had transposed the Directive into national law.43 
The 10 “new Member States”44 had implemented the Directive 
into national law by May 1, 2004. Two Member States, Romania 
and Bulgaria, joined the EU on January 1, 2007,45 and have 
implemented the Directive. Croatia also became a member of the 
EU in 2013.  
III. LANDMARK COURT DECISIONS 
An important aspect of gauging anti-discrimination progress 
against sexual orientation minorities in the EU workplace is to 
analyze the rulings of the EU courts. There have been three 
landmark court cases. These three cases—Sweden v. Council,46 
Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen47 and Römer 
v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg48—will be discussed and 
analyzed to determine the level of protection of sexual orientation 
minorities in regard to employment benefits for registered same-
sex partners. 
In order to better understand the rulings of the following 
decisions, it is essential to understand the process that the cases 
underwent, in particular, the ECJ’s49 preliminary reference 
process. 
 43. See EUROPA, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-
69_en.htm?locale=en (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
 44. See Treaty concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union, April 16, 2003.  
 45.  See Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the European Union, April 25, 2005.  
 46. Joined Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99P, Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 
I-4319. 
 47. Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen 
Bühnen, 2008 E.C.R I-01757. 
 48. Case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2010 
E.C.R. I-3595. 
 49. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 19, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 1, at 27 [hereinafter TEU].  
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A. The European Court of Justice Preliminary Reference Process 
The preliminary reference process is detailed in article 267 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
“TFEU”).50 The article describes the process in which a Member 
State’s national court may refer a case to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter “ECJ” or “the Court”). The article 
confers jurisdiction to the Court on preliminary rulings in 
interpreting treaties. Furthermore, jurisdiction is conferred “where 
such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member 
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on 
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the 
Court to give a ruling thereon.”51 In essence when there is a 
question as to how to interpret EU law by the national Member 
States, the Member States are allowed to refer the question to the 
Court.  
Procedurally, there are three stages to the preliminary 
reference. The first stage is when the national court of a Member 
State seeks a preliminary reference from the Court. The next stage 
is when the Court makes a decision regarding the interpretation of 
EU law or answers a legal question brought before it. Lastly, after 
the Court has made a decision, the national court and the litigants 
decide how to implement the decision of the Court. After the Court 
rules, the national court will then make its own decision, while 
The Court of Justice of the European Union includes the Court of Justice, the 
General Court and specialized courts. The Court is tasked with ensuring proper 
application and interpretation of Treaty laws. The body of the Court consists of 
one judge from each Member State. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall: 
[in] accordance with the Treaties: (a) rule on actions brought by a 
Member State, an institution or a natural or legal person; (b) give 
preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member 
States, on the interpretation of Union Law or the validity of acts 
adopted by the institutions; (c) rule in other cases provided for in the 
Treaties. Id. 
 50. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 267, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 51. Id. 
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applying the Court’s interpretation of EU law, or the Court’s 
answer to the legal question brought before it.52 
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited in scope. As such, 
“there are two legal norms that can become the object of a 
preliminary ruling.”53 The Court has jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of Treaties and the “validity and interpretation of 
acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union.”54  
B. The Application of the Directive in Landmark Cases  
1. Sweden v. Council 
Sweden v. Council consolidated two appeals from the judgment 
in the Court of First Instance.55 The law applicable to the facts of 
Sweden predated the implementation of the Directive, but the 
ruling was made after the Directive was passed.56 The plaintiff, 
Mr. D, brought action against the Council of the European Union 
(hereinafter “Council”) after its refusal to award Mr. D a 
household allowance under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities (hereinafter “Staff Regulations”).57 The 
 52. Stacy Nvikos, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: 
Strategic Interaction within the EU Judicial Process (eds. Lee Epstein and 
Stanley L. Paulsen, Paper presented at Washington University at St. Louis on 
Comparative Constitutional Courts, 2001), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.195.6306&rep=rep1&
type=pdf (Last visited March 25, 2014). 
 53. See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
305-310 (2nd ed., Carolina Acad. Press 2013).  
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Case T-264/97, D v. Council, 1999 E.C.R.-SC I-A-1 and II-1. Prior to 
2009 the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) heard appeals from 
Commission decisions. Post-2009, the CFI is known as the General Court.  
 56. Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, para. 4. (The Coucil rejected Mr. D’s 
application for the Staff Regulation benefit in 1996. The case was decided in 
2001, one year after the Directive was implemented).  
 57. Article 1(2) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities (‘the Staff Regulations’) provides as follows: 
The household allowance shall be granted to: 
a. A married official; 
b. An official who is widowed, divorced, legally separated or 
unmarried and has one or more dependent children . . . .  
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Council enacted the Staff Regulation, which regulated employee 
pension benefits. Mr. D, a Swedish national, was an official of the 
European Communities, as an employee of the Council.58 Mr. D 
entered into a registered same-sex partnership with another 
Swedish national on June 23, 1995.59 The allowances were 
available to married officials, among others.60 Mr. D applied for 
the allowance and requested that his same-sex partnership be 
treated equivalently to marriage for purposes of qualifying for the 
allowance.61 The Council denied his request.62 The Council 
reasoned that the same-sex partnerships could not be treated as 
equivalent to marriage for the purpose of obtaining the allowance.  
Mr. D subsequently filed a complaint with the Secretary 
General of the Council. The Secretary General denied his request, 
and cited the same reasons given by the Council.63 Mr. D then filed 
a complaint to the Court of First Instance.64 His complaint 
requested—among other things65—for the Court of First Instance 
c. By special reasoned decision of the appointing authority based on 
supporting documents, an official who, while not fulfilling the 
conditions laid down in (a) and (b), nevertheless actually assumes 
family responsibilities. 
 58. Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, para. 4. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. (“The Council rejected the application, by note of 29 November 
1996, on the ground that the provisions of the Staff Regulations could not be 
construed as allowing a ‘registered partnership’ to be treated equivalent to 
marriage”). 
 63. Id. at para. 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at para 7. Mr. D also pleaded: 
1. Entitlement to other general provisions “applicable to officials of the 
European Communities”. 
2. An infringement on non-discrimination based on EU law—including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
3. “Infringement of the principle of equal pay for men and women contained in 
Article 119 of the EC Treaty—Article 117 to 12o of the EC Treaty have been 
replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC).” Id.  
As to first plea, the court acknowledged only the household allowance under the 
Staff Regulations, and no other general provisions that are applicable to officials 
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to annul the refusal of the Secretary General to allow his same-sex 
partnership to be considered equivalent to marriage for the 
purposes of obtaining the household allowance.  
Although Mr. D raised other grounds on appeal,66 the Court of 
First Instance limited its ruling to the household allowances under 
the Staff Regulation.67 The court cited Arouxo v. Commission68 in 
concluding that for purposes of the Staff Regulation “the concept 
of marriage must be understood as meaning a relationship based on 
civil marriage within the traditional meaning of the term.”69 The 
court further ruled that the Council was under “no obligation to 
regard as equivalent to marriage, for the purposes of the Staff 
Regulation, the situation of a person who had a stable relationship 
with a partner of the same sex, even if the relationship was 
recognized by national authority.”70 Lastly, the court held that the 
reference to the Member State’s law on marriage was inapplicable 
as the Staff Regulation was susceptible of an independent 
interpretation.71 Thus, the court rejected his claim. 
of the European Communities. In regards to the second plea, the court held that 
since the Convention of Human Rights does “not cover long-term homosexual 
relationships” no infringement could have occurred. Finally, the court held that 
as to the plea of equal pay, the Staff Regulations applied equally to both sexes, 
and thus do not lead to discrimination. 
 66. See Id.  
 67. Id. at para. 8. The court held that:  
[the plea of non-discrimination was under] Council Regulation (EC, 
ECSCM Euratom) No 781/91 of 7 April 1988 amending the Staff 
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other 
Servants of the European Communities in respect of equal treatment 
(O.J. 1998 L. 113, p. 4), which introduced Article 1a into the Staff 
Regulations giving officials entitlement to equal treatment irrespective 
of their sexual orientation, without prejudice to the provision of the 
Staff Regulations requiring a particular marital status, did not enter into 
force until after the adoption of the contested decision and so it was not 
appropriate to take the regulation into consideration. Id. 
 68. Id. at para. 11. Case T-65/92, 1993 E.C.R. II-593.  
 69. Case T-65/92, Arauxo-Dumay, 1993 E.C.R., para. 28. 
 70. Id. at para. 12. 
 71. Id. at para. 11. 
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Mr. D appealed to the ECJ, and the Government of Sweden 
(hereinafter “Government”) intervened on his behalf.72 The 
Government argued that since civil status is a matter which comes 
within the exclusive competence of the Member States, terms such 
as married official or spouse should be interpreted by reference to 
law of the Member States and not given an independent 
interpretation (as defined in the Staff Regulation).73 The issue 
before the Court was whether married spouses and same-sex 
couples in a registered partnership should be treated as equivalent 
for the purposes of the allowance, and if so, whether Mr. D was 
discriminated against because of his sexual orientation. 
Furthermore, the Court was asked which definition of marriage—
the Member States or the Staff Regulation—should control in 
regards to the household allowance under the Staff Regulation.  
The Court held that the Court of First Instance did not err when 
it rejected the petition because “even in the law of those Member 
States which recognize the concept of registered partnership, that 
concept is distinct from marriage . . . .”74 The Court stated that the 
issue in this case (“the question whether the concepts of marriage 
and registered partnership should be treated as distinct or 
equivalent . . .”75) was an issue of first impression. Nevertheless, 
the Court held that refusal to grant the allowance was not 
discriminatory based on sex, as it was applicable to both men and 
women.76 Furthermore, the Court held that the sex of the partners 
is not determinative, but rather it is the tie between the partners 
that counts.77 Next, the Court held that the “principle of equal 
treatment can apply only to persons in comparable situations,”78 
 72. Id. at para 17. 
 73. Id. at para. 29. 
 74. Id. (The court further stated that it was for the EU legislature to decide 
the equivalency and not the role of the judiciary, as the EU legislature dealt with 
budgetary and financial impact of the Staff Regulation). 
 75. Id. at para. 33. 
 76. Id. at para. 46. 
 77. Id. at para. 47.  
 78. Id. at para. 48. 
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thus it was necessary to consider whether a married official could 
be comparable to registered partnership between same-sex 
couples.79 The Court first assessed the prominent view of the 
“Community” in its entirety—and stated that there was an 
“absence of any general assimilation of marriage and other forms 
of statutory union.”80 As such, and in light of the Court’s 
observations, the appeal was rejected.81 Nevertheless, the Court 
stated that it is for the Community legislature to amend the Staff 
Regulation language to encompass same-sex partnership for the 
purpose of qualifying for the allowance under the Staff Regulation. 
2. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen 
In 2008, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen 
was decided. In 2001, Mr. Maruko entered into a registered same-
sex partnership with another German national.82 His partner, Hans 
Hettinger, was a theatrical costume designer.83 Their partnership 
was formed under the Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz (LParG),84 a 
German law that provides legal protection for partnerships that 
resembled marriage. In 2005, Mr. Maruko’s partner died.85 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at para. 50. 
 81. Mr. D, for the first time (in front of the Court of Justice) raised an issue 
of a plea relating to discrimination based on nationality and restriction of 
freedom of movement. The Court rejected these pleas because they were not 
asserted in the lower court. The Court also rejected Mr. D’s plea relating to 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 82. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 19.  
 83. Id.  
 84. See paragraph 1 of the Law on registered life partnerships (Gesetz uber 
die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft) of 16 February 2001 (BGBI. 2001, I, p. 
266), as amended by the Law of 15 Dec 2004 (BGBI. 2004 I, p. 3396, the 
“LPartG”): 
(1) Two persons of the same sex establish a partnership when they each 
declare, in person and in the presence of the other that they wish to live 
together in partnership for life (as life partners). The declarations 
cannot be made conditionally or for a fixed period. Declarations are 
effective when they are made before the competent authority. 
 85. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 21. 
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A month after his partner’s death, Mr. Maruko petitioned the 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhnen (VddB),86 the insurance 
company that provided his partner’s survivor pension for artists, to 
receive the widowers or surviving spouse pension.87 Maruko’s 
partner, as a costume designer, qualified for the pension. 
Furthermore, Maruko’s partner voluntarily contributed to the 
insurance plan, even though he was under no obligation to do so.88 
The VddB denied Mr. Maruko’s petition.89 
The VddB’s interpretation of a widow or widower pension 
included married spouses only, and did not include partners in a 
registered partnership.90 Mr. Maruko brought a claim before the 
Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht München (Bavarian 
Administrative Court) in Munich.91 Mr. Maruko asserted that 
VddB’s refusal to grant the pension infringed “the principle of 
equal treatment” since registered partnerships have been placed on 
the same footing as marriage, specifically, because paragraph 46(4) 
was introduced in the Social Security Code.92 Mr. Maruko further 
asserted that to deny the pension would constitute discrimination 
based on sexual orientation since married spouses were in a 
comparable situation with registered partners.93 Lastly, Mr. 
Maruko claimed that because German law prescribed the same 
 86. Id. at para. 22. 
 87. Paragraphs 32 and 34 of the VddB Regulations defined Widow(er’s) 
pension as follows: 
Para. 32 (widow’s pension): (1) “The spouse of the insured man or retired man, 
if the marriage subsists on the day of the latter’s death, shall be entitled to a 
widow’s pension.” 
Para. 34 (widower’s pension): (1) “The spouse of the insured woman or retired 
woman, if the marriage subsists on the day of the latter’s death, shall be entitled 
to a widower’s pension.” 
 88. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 20. 
 89. Id. at para. 22 (the VddB rejected Mr. Maruko’s application “on the 
ground that its regulations did not provide for such entitlement for surviving life 
partners”). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at para. 23 (the Bavarian Administrative Court, Munich, is the 
referring court).  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
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rules relating to property to both life partnerships and marriages, 
by extension, the VddB could not withhold the pension.94 The 
VddB considered95 their insurance scheme as a state social 
security96 and, as such, argued that it should not be defined as 
“pay” within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c)97 of the Directive. 
Consequently, if the insurance scheme was not within the scope 
and reach of the Directive, the VddB was not obligated to grant 
Mr. Maruko’s request.  
The Bavarian Administrative Court stated that “in view of the 
structure of the VddB and the decisive influence exercised by the 
theatre companies and insured persons over its operations, we are 
inclined to think that the VddB does not manage a scheme 
equivalent to a state social security scheme, within the meaning of 
Article 3(3) of Directive 2000/78.”98 The court further stated that 
unlike heterosexual couples, it was impossible for Mr. Maruko and 
his partner to satisfy the terms of marriage set forth in the VddB 
survivors’ insurance benefit because of their sexual orientation.99 
Furthermore, satisfying the terms of marriage was dependent upon 
receiving the pension.100 The court, in its referral to the ECJ, asked 
whether the “combined provisions of Article 1 and Article 2(2)(a) 
of the Directive precludes provisions in regulations such as those 
of the VddB,”101 under which a person whose life partner has died 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at para. 35.  
 96. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(3): “This Directive does not apply to 
payments of any kind made by state schemes or similar, including state social 
security or social protection schemes.” 
 97. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(c): “[T]his Directive shall apply to all 
persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, 
in relation to . . . employment and working conditions, including . . . pay.” 
 98. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, at para. 25. 
 99. Id. at para. 29. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at para. 27. See also Directive, supra note 25, art. 1 (“The purpose of 
this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination 
on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the 
Member States the principle of equal treatment”) & art. 2(2)(a) (“[D]irect 
discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favorably 
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does not receive survivor’s benefits equivalent to those offered to a 
surviving spouse, even though, like spouses, the life partners have 
been living in a union of mutual support and assistance which was 
constituted for life.  
The court stated that the VddB provision was contrary to the 
Directive, which “precludes provisions such as those of the VddB 
regulation,”102 under which entitlement to those benefit was 
restricted to surviving spouses. The court concluded that there was 
discrimination based on sexual orientation against Mr. Maruko 
because his claim fell within the Directive.103  
Nevertheless, the Bavarian Court suspended its proceedings 
and sought a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.104 The issue 
presented to the Court was whether VddB’s insurance scheme was 
a state scheme under article 3(3),105 or, more specifically, whether 
the insurance scheme for widow and widower’s pension qualified 
as “pay” under Article 3(1)(c)106 of the Directive. The Bavarian 
Court also presented the issue of whether article 1, in conjunction 
with article 2(2)(a) precludes regulations such as those by the 
VddB in which a registered partnership is not treated equivalent to 
married spouses in obtaining pension benefits.107 Lastly, the court 
questioned (if the above issues were answered in the affirmative) 
whether Mr. Maruko was discriminated based on his sexual 
orientation.108 The Bavarian Court feared that they would interpret 
the Directive broadly if they answered the above issues in the 
affirmative without first obtaining a preliminary reference from the 
ECJ. 
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any 
of the grounds referred to in Article 1”). 
 102. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 30. 
 103. Id. at para. 28. 
 104. Id. at para. 33. 
 105. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 107. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para 33.  
 108. Id.  
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The ECJ deduced that first; the survivors’ pension was the 
result of the employment relationship between Maruko’s partner 
and the VddB, and “therefore, must be classified as ‘pay’ within 
the meaning of the Directive.”109 Next, the Court ruled that articles 
1 and 2 of the Directive forbid both direct and indirect sexual 
orientation discrimination.110 As such, the VddB’s requirement 
that the recipient of the survivor benefit be married constituted 
indirect discrimination under the Directive since gays and lesbians 
are unable to marry in Germany, but are afforded equal protection 
as married spouses and considered to be in comparable 
situations.111 The national law recognized a movement in the 
equivalency of marriage and partnerships, and likewise, that:  
[T]he combined provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of [the 
Directive] preclude provisions such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings under which, after the death of his life 
partner, the surviving partner does not receive a survivor’s 
benefit equivalent to that granted to a surviving spouse, 
even though, under national law, life partnership places 
persons of the same sex in a situation comparable to that of 
spouses so far as concerns that survivor’s benefit.112  
The Court referred the case back to the Bavarian 
Administrative Court to determine whether spouses and 
partnerships are equivalent or compatible113 under German law. If 
they were, then Maruko would be entitled to the insurance benefit 
held by VddB.  
3. Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 
Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg was decided in 2011. 
Römer worked for Freie (employer) as an administrative employee 
 109. Id. at para. 56. 
 110. Id. at para. 66. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at para. 73. 
 113. Id. The Court also stated “it is for the referring court to determine 
whether a surviving life partner is in a situation comparable to that of a spouse 
who is entitled to the survivor’s benefit under the occupational pension scheme 
managed by the VddB.”  
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from 1950 until May 1990, when he ceased working due to 
incapacity.114 On October 15, 2001, Mr. Römer and his partner, 
Mr. U entered into a registered partnership pursuant to the 
LPartG.115 Before their registered partnership, Mr. Römer and Mr. 
U resided together continuously since 1969.116 Shortly after the 
couple entered the registered partnership, Mr. Römer wrote a letter 
to inform his [former] employer of the registered partnership.117 A 
month after the first letter—and on November 28, 2001—Mr. 
Römer wrote a second letter and “requested a recalculation of his 
ongoing pension entitlement on the basis of the more advantageous 
deduction of income tax . . . .”118 under the First RGG.119 The 
employer refused and stated that, according to the First RGG, only 
married pensioners were entitled to the tax calculations, and since 
Römer was in a partnership, he would not qualify for the 
calculation under the First RGG pension plan.120 The calculations 
showed that Römer’s retirement pension would have been higher if 
Römer was in tax category 111/0 as opposed to tax category I.121 
After the employer refused to re-calculate his pension, Römer 
brought suit in the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg, a national labor court 
 114. Römer, 2010 E.C.R. I-3595, at para 22.  
 115. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Erstes Ruhegeldgesetz, (the First RGG—Additional Supplementary 
Retirement and Survivors’ Pensions Act), May 30, 1995, [GVBI.] at 108 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter the First RGG]. 
 120. Id. The employer cited paragraph 10(6)(1) of the First RGG, which 
states, in pertinent part:  
[I]n a day of commencement of the retirement benefits . . . is not 
permanently separated married pensioners, as well as a pension 
recipient who is entitled to child allowance or a corresponding power to 
this day, the amount of that day as a wage tax . . . would be paid by tax 
class 111/0. 
 121. Id. at para. 24:  
Mr. Römer’s monthly pension, from September 2001, determined on 
the basis of tax category I, amounted to DEM 1204.55 (EUR 615.88). 
According to Mr. Römer’s calculations, which are not disputed by his 
ex-employer, that monthly retirement pension would have been, in 
September 2001, DEM 590.87 (EUR 302.11) higher if tax category III 
had been applied. 
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in Germany.122 He argued that under the Directive his calculations 
for the tax in his pension should be viewed as equal with married 
pensioners, and argued that “the criterion of ‘married pensioners,’ 
laid down by the provision must be interpreted as meaning that it 
includes pensioners who have entered into a civil partnership in 
accordance with the LPartG.”123 Römer further contended that, 
under the Directive, he had a cause of action to claim an equal 
calculation as a married pensioner.124 
Römer’s employer rejected the above-mentioned contentions 
and claimed that the pension calculation system applies only to 
“families under the special protection of the state,”125 and marriage 
is “usually a prerequisite to forming a family, because it is the 
most usual form of relationship between men and women 
[recognized] by law and it constitutes a framework for the birth of 
children, and therefore the transformation of the married couple 
into a family.”126 Thus, the employer continued, the advantage of 
the calculation system was designed to compensate for the extra 
financial burden involved in having a family.127 The Arbeitsgericht 
Hamburg acknowledged that the LPartG—the law, under which 
Römer and his partner registered their partnership, as amended in 
2004—was geared towards a gradual harmonization of registered 
partnerships and marriage. Furthermore, the court stated that under 
German law there are no significant differences between 
partnerships and marriage, except that marriage is between people 
of opposite sex.  
However, the court decided to suspend its proceedings and 
refer the case to the ECJ.128 The question to be decided was 
whether the supplementary retirement pensions such as those given 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at para. 25. 
 124. Id. at para. 26. 
 125. Id. at para. 27. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at para. 34. 
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to former employees of Freie fall within the scope of the 
Directive.129 If so, whether article 2130 of the Directive prohibits a 
scheme that favors married pensioners over partners in a registered 
same-sex partnership, resulting in either direct or indirect 
discrimination.131  
First, the Court held that the supplementary retirement pension 
qualified as “pay” within the Directive, and further held that the 
state social security scheme exception under article 3(3) was 
inapplicable.132 The Court also held that under the national law of 
Germany, registered partnerships and marriage have no legally 
significant differences, and “the main remaining difference is the 
fact that marriage presupposes that the spouses are of different 
gender, whereas registered life partnership presupposes that the 
partners are of the same gender.”133 Thus, no sufficient difference 
exists which would justify the unequal treatment of Römer and as 
such, provisions such as that in the First RGG that grants lower 
supplemental retirement pension to registered partnerships based 
solely on sexual orientation constitutes direct discrimination.134 
Furthermore, after the Court’s finding of direct discrimination, it 
held that it is for the “referring court to assess the comparability” 
of spouses and individuals in a registered partnership.135 
Accordingly, the Court stated that in making this assessment, the 
referring court should focus on the rights and obligations of 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 2, which provides, in pertinent parts: 
For purposes of paragraph 1: 
(a) [D]irect discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is 
treated less [favorably] than another is, has been or would be treated in 
a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to . . . . 
(b) [I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons 
having a particular . . . sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage 
compared with others . . . . 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at para. 35-36.  
 133. Id. at para 45. 
 134. Id. at para. 52. 
 135. Id.  
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married spouses and persons in partnerships, which are relevant 
inquiries considering “the purpose of and the conditions for the 
grant of the benefit in question.”136 Nevertheless, the Court, citing 
Maruko, noted that German law “. . . made it clear that registered 
life partnership is to be treated as equivalent to marriage as regards 
the widow’s or widower’s pension.”137 
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS  
A. The Supranational Nature of EU Law  
The EU operates on a supranational level and on limited 
sovereign powers that have been conceded by the Member 
States.138 A constitutional treaty which some argue might have 
resulted in a federalist structure was proposed, but never 
ratified.139 Accordingly, the Member States participate in a 
cooperative manner in exercising their sovereignty.140 Therefore, 
the EU can only act “within the limits of the areas of competence 
conferred on the Community.”141 Thus, in accepting a case that has 
been referred to it, the Court must first decide whether the issue 
initially presented before the national court (referring court) deals 
with interpretation of EU law, as the Court cannot interpret 
national law.142 Furthermore, the Court is also limited in granting 
an opinion to the issue referred to it.143 The Court must find a 
balance between enforcing EU law and refraining from enforcing 
areas of law that are within the exclusive competence of Member 
States.144  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at para. 42. 
 138. KLAUS-DIETER BURCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 23-
88 (Publication office of the European Union 2010). 
 139. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 
310) 1 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty]. 
 140. Id. at 98. 
 141. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 3. 
 142. See supra Part III.A.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Römer, 2010 E.C.R. I-3595, para. 38. 
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 The “marital status of persons falls exclusively within the 
competence of the Member States.”145 As such, an important 
hurdle in the applicability of the Directive in the above cases was 
to determine whether the national court (referring court) would 
make the compatibility determination—that is, whether marriage is 
treated equivalently as a registered same-sex partnership.146 The 
Court cannot decide the validity of a Member States’ restriction on 
same-sex partnerships, marriages or unions. However, once a 
Member State has decided to confer a status on same-sex 
partnerships that is comparable to married spouses—as in the 
Maruko and Römer decisions—the denial of benefits on the basis 
of a claimant’s sexual orientation would then be within the 
purview of the Court’s jurisdiction.147 
The Makuo decision was the first time the Court ruled “in favor 
of same-sex couples.”148 Thus, the Maruko and Römer decisions 
where progressive milestones in the right of sexual orientation 
minority in EU in general, and in the employment benefit context, 
in particular. These cases were in stark contrast to the ruling in 
Sweden. The Sweden decision was distinguishable from the latter 
two cases for several reasons. First, in the Sweden decision, the 
issue of comparability determination between same-sex 
partnerships and marriage was an issue of first impression before 
the Court.149 Second, the Sweden decision dealt with a Community 
Staff Regulation, which was susceptible to its own independent 
interpretation. According to the Court, the independent 
interpretation correlated with the Community practices at the time 
 145. Id.  
 146. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 147. Id. In both the Maruko and Römer decisions, the Court stated that if the 
national court where to find that the status conferred to same-sex partnership is 
comparable to that of married spouses in regard to the respective pension plans, 
then the claimants would be entitled to receive the pension benefits, 
notwithstanding the classification of the relationships.  
 148. EU backs gay man’s pension rights, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008, 15:44 
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7324824.stm. 
 149. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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Sweden was decided.150 As such, the decision in Sweden derived 
from the Court’s determination that in implementing the Staff 
Regulation, the Community legislature had the traditional meaning 
of marriage in mind. That is, the Staff Regulation did not anticipate 
coverage of same-sex partnerships, marriages or unions because 
there was an “absence of any general assimilation of marriage and 
other forms of statutory union,” for same-sex couples within the 
Community.151 Thus, although there was clear discrimination in 
Sweden, the Court was limited in its ruling, as the Staff Regulation 
interpretation forbade further scrutiny by the Court. Third, unlike 
Maruko and Römer, the Staff Regulations’ ability of independent 
interpretation hindered the comparability analysis in Sweden.  
The Court went on to rule, however, in the later cases, that the 
Member States should determine the compatibility of partnerships 
and marriages, and if such compatibility were founded, the 
plaintiffs would be entitled to their pensions and insurance, 
respectively. Thus, even though the Swedish Government granted 
a comparative situation to same-sex registered partnerships as 
married couples, the ability of the Staff Regulations independent 
interpretation made such determination irrelevant. Ironically, the 
latter cases hinged upon such determination. The Court, for its 
part, called for the EU legislature to amend the language of the 
Staff Regulation.152 It remains to be seen whether the result of the 
Court in Sweden would have been different if the case dealt instead 
with an insurance company such as the VddB in Maruko, and not a 
Staff Regulation sponsored by the Community.153 Lastly, Sweden 
is distinguishable from Maruko and Römer, as the Sweden 
 150. See, e.g., Ian Curry-Sumner, Same-sex Realationships in Europe: 
Trends Toward Tolerance? 3 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 44, 51 (2011) (When 
Sweden was decided in 2001, Germany and Finland allowed registered-
partnership, and only the Netherlands allowed same-sex marriage. This suggests 
that the court took into account the “Community practice,” which indicated a 
reluctance to grant martial and partnership status to same-sex couples).  
 151. See supra Part III.B.1.  
 152. Id.  
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decision, although factually similar to the latter cases, could not 
have been analyzed under the Directive. It would have been 
interesting whether Sweden would have been decided differently if 
the Directive would have been applicable.  
An essential part of the applicability of the Directive was 
whether the employment benefit sought qualified as “pay.” If the 
benefit did not qualify as “pay” it would fall outside the scope of 
the Directive.154 The relevant articles of the Directive are articles 
1, 2 and 3.155 Article 1 established the protected grounds.156 Article 
2 defines direct and indirect discrimination, both of which are 
covered under the Directive.157 Article 3(1)(c) covers “pay” within 
the confines of the Directive,158 while article 3(3) removes state 
social security schemes from the Directive’s coverage.159  
The Court’s recognition that the calculation scheme in Römer 
and the insurance scheme in Maruko qualified as “pay” within 
article 3, was the first step in order for appellant’s to assert their 
claim under the Directive.160 Had the Court ruled differently (that 
these benefits were not considered “pay” for the purposes of the 
Directive) the Court would not have reached the question of 
whether the respective provisions were discriminatory. The next 
step was the Court’s ruling that—pursuant to article 2—the 
appellants were either directly or indirectly discriminated against 
because they were not treated comparably with married couples 
with whom they were similarly situated.161 Without such finding, 
the Court would not have had a reason to request the compatibility 
analysis from the national courts so as to determine whether 
partnerships where comparable to marriage in order for the 
 154. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Directive, supra note 25, arts. 1, 2 & 3. 
 156. See supra Part I.  
 157. See supra note 130.  
 158. See supra note 97.  
 159. See supra note 96.  
 160. See supra Part III.B.2 & Part III.B.3. 
 161. See supra Part III.B.  
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appellants to claim entitlement of such benefits.162 Thus, the Court 
was right to find that the rejection of a survivor pension by a 
partner should be deemed less favorable treatment, because a 
married spouse would be automatically entitled to the pension, 
while a partner would not. Furthermore, it was important that the 
Court not only concluded that the treatment was less favorable, but 
that the provisions in both Römer and Maruko were unacceptable 
because they attempted to restrict benefits for same-sex partners, 
who otherwise qualified for the benefits under national law.  
Although the Directive is not as strong as it could be due to the 
nature of the EU,163 the Member States are entitled to grant greater 
protection than the Directive provides.164 As such, the Member 
States and their judicial branch should be at the forefront in 
providing for higher protection than the Directive calls for. This 
request at first glance seems feasible. However, while heighted 
protection from Germany made all the difference in the latter two 
cases, the Sweden case showed how a different level of protection 
failed to accomplish the task.165 As a consequence, the question 
becomes whether the protection for same-sex partnership rests 
upon the type of benefit that is challenged, as opposed to the 
Member State’s grant to same-sex partners of comparable status to 
married spouses. Furthermore, in Sweden the Court stated that the 
sexual orientation of the partners did not matter, but that it was the 
tie between the partners that mattered.166 However, in Maruko and 
Römer, the Court ruled that it was discrimination based on sexual 
orientation because the tie between the partners could never be one 
of marriage due to their sexual orientation.167 The rulings in both 
Maruko and Römer have proven to be big steps forward for EU 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. See also Part II. 
 164. See supra Part III.B. 
 165. See Part III.B.1 through 3.  
 166. See Part III.B.1. 
 167. See supra Part III.B.2 & Part III.B.3.  
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citizens in registered same-sex partnerships in providing the 
opportunity to recover employment benefits.  
Currently, sixteen of the EU Member States recognize some 
form of registered partnership, with nearly ten of the Member 
States recognizing same-sex marriage.168 However, since the 
definition of comparability is within the Member States 
competence, it is possible that provisions such as the VddB, and 
those in Freie169 would be considered non-discriminatory, if same-
sex partnerships and marriage are not considered comparable to 
married spouses. Accordingly, if a Member State allows same sex 
partnerships, but does not confer comparable benefits to the 
partners as those of married spouses, the citizen would 
undoubtedly be treated as second class solely because the Member 
State does not accord comparability status. Thus, in essence, “this 
means that the Member States frame the comparability between 
homosexual and heterosexual situations and thereby indirectly 
decide upon the applicability of EU law,”170 by granting a benefit 
to a same-sex partner, but failing to uphold such benefit like in the 
case of married spouses, thereby removing the matter from the 
confines of the Directive, and from the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, it would also be legal to refuse same-sex partners 
from benefitting from the same employment benefits as those 
enjoyed by married spouses. In the Maruko case, the “results 
would have been very different if Germany would [not have 
 168. See Emmanuelle Bribosia, Isabelle Rorive & Laura Van den Eynde, 
Same-Sex Marriage—Building an Argument before the European Court of 
Human Rights in Light of the U.S. Experience, 32 BERKELEY INT’L L. J. (2013). 
The Netherlands was the first to do so in 2001, since then, Belgium, Spain, 
Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom have legalized 
same-sex marriage. Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Austria, Ireland and Spain recognize some form of same-sex 
partnership, while Croatia recognizes unregistered cohabitation. Cyprus, 
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Bulgaria do not recognize any form of same-sex partnership or marriage.  
 169. Römer, 2010 E.C.R. I-3595. 
 170. Gabriel N. Toggenburg, LGTB go Luxembourg: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
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provided] life partners with a ‘comparable situation so far as it 
concerns survivors benefit . . . .’”171 Even though, concededly, the 
structure of the EU lends itself to this form of governance, the goal 
of equal application of the Directive to all Member States would be 
hampered. Articles 1 and 2 call for combating unfavorable 
treatment based on sexual orientation. The cases presented above 
show that a Member State could allow same-sex partnerships, but 
with none of the benefits that married couples would have, if the 
Member State decides that partnerships and marriage are not 
comparable. In such a case, essentially, the partnership would be in 
name only.  
B. A Survey of Sexual Orientation Rights Before and After the 
Directive 
The Directive itself—having been implemented—is an 
important step towards equal treatment of sexual minorities, of 
same-sex partners in regard to employment benefits, in particular, 
and EU sexual minorities citizens in general. Even though the case 
law on the Directive has been based on granting pensions and 
insurance benefit for same-sex partners, the Directive has provided 
relief in other areas as well. For instance, before the Directive, 
sexual minorities in the workplace did not have a cause of action or 
remedy against those who discriminated against them. The 
Directive offers explicit judicial and administrative remedy for 
victims, reinforced by the stipulations that the sanctions chosen 
must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive in case of 
breaches of the obligation . . . .”172  
The Directive, in effect, stands for a proposition that sexual 
orientation discrimination ought to be taken seriously, and 
remedied accordingly. This tough stance on discrimination is 
further apparent under the Directive as the defendant has the 
burden of proving the absence of discrimination. 
 171. Id. at 180. 
 172. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 3. 
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Under the Directive, it is easier to “challenge legally the 
conduct of persons responsible for carrying out homophobic 
harassment in the workplace.”173 In turn, as stated before, the 
Directive grants a direct remedy to those who have been 
discriminated against.174 As such, those discriminated against 
would no longer have to rely on weaker law and weaker theories of 
recovery, such as harassment, assault or battery.  
As a result of the Directive, labor organizations in the EU have 
mobilized in an effort to promote the Directive’s objectives and 
goals. The European Trade Union Confederation (hereinafter 
“ETUC”) is one such organization. One aim of the ETUC is to 
promote and defend human and civil rights, while demanding 
equality in the workplace for sexual orientation minorities.175 In 
the wake of the Directive, the ETUC has partnered with other 
national governmental organizations and trade unions in furthering 
their commitment to equal treatment, respect and dignity for 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered (hereinafter “LGBT”) 
citizens in the workplace.176 As part of its commitment to 
eliminate sexual orientation discrimination, the ETUC has set up a 
four-year action plan.177 This plan is aimed at raising awareness of 
LGBT discrimination in the workplace, and promoting diversity, 
non-discrimination, as well as raising awareness to sexual 
orientation discrimination among trade union members.178 
 173. Id. 
 174. See e.g., supra Part I, discussing the judicial unenforceability of earlier 
provisions by EU citizens against those who discriminated against them.  
 175. Jane Pillinger, Extending Equality: Trade Unions Actions to Organise 
and Promote Equal Rights, Respect and Dignity for Workers Regardless of their 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 9-45 (European Trade Union 
Confederation 2008), available at http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org 
/files/ETUC_inside-2.pdf (last visited March 31, 2014).  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. 
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In the EU, sexual orientation minorities are sometimes referred 
to as invisible citizens179 because they have to hide their sexual 
orientation to prevent harassment. Another labor organization, the 
European Commission EQUAL Community Initiative (hereinafter 
“EQUAL”), has the objective of ending the invisibility of sexual 
minorities in the workplace.180 The EQUAL initiative was co-
founded by the Member States after the adoption of the 
Directive.181 The aim of EQUAL resembles that of the ETUC.182 
EQUAL’s objective is to create a working environment in the EU 
where homosexuals feel safe in the workplace.183 It is safe to say 
that without the Directive the above-mentioned organizations 
would not have been created. Furthermore, absent the Directive, 
such organizations could not effectively promote and raise 
awareness of discrimination of sexual minorities in the workplace. 
As such, the Directive has had notable accomplishments. First, 
the Directive provided labor organizations with a law to rely on in 
implementing change. Second, EU Member States sexual 
orientation minority citizens can rely on the Directive in court. 
Third, in connection with the applicability of the Directive in court, 
sexual minority citizens are able to seek remedies against violators 
 179. See, e.g., Homosexuals. The Invisible Citizens of Lithuania, BALTIC 
WORLDS, http://balticworlds.com/homosexuals-the-invisible-citizens-of-
lithuania (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). These “invisible citizens”—as they are 
termed by the sociologists who authored a large-scale survey on homophobia in 
Lithuania—are subject to several forms of discrimination, most notably in the 
workplace. In Lithuania, they do not benefit from any legal recognition or 
organized communal life.  
 180. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Member States of 14.04.2000 Establishing the Guidelines for the Community 
Initiative EQUAL Concerning Transnational Cooperation to Promote New 
Means of Combating Discrimination and Inequalities in Connection with the 
Labour Market, C (2000) 853, 2000 O.J. (C 127). 
 181. Id. The European Social Funds initially funded EQUAL. 
 182. Id. EQUAL also relies on the impact of media coverage to raise 
awareness of the rights of sexual minorities in the workplace. In addition, 
EQUAL takes it a step further and addresses LGBT issues in organizations such 
as churches, the police and the military. Furthermore, the EQUAL partnership 
has succeeded in educating and training management groups, trade union and 
work personnel. 
 183. Id. 
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of the Directive. In light of the above, the Directive has been 
successful.  
C. By the Numbers: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Prevalence 
Before and After the Directive 
In comparing the prevalence of sexual orientation 
discrimination in the workplace, it is important to view both pre-
Directive and post-Directive numbers. Unfortunately, there is no 
system for assessing adverse impact of discrimination in the EU. 
This makes tracking the progress made after the implementation of 
the Directive difficult. However, “an action plan on statistics and a 
forthcoming EU Regulation are geared towards achieving 
comparable data of sexual orientation discrimination in the 
workplace at the EU level.”184 
Nevertheless, statistics are taken from independent sources to 
gauge the progress of the Directive’s anti-discrimination measures. 
Before the Directive was implemented, anti-gay discrimination 
was considered prevalent.185 A 1994 survey revealed that almost 
sixteen percent of respondents agreed that they had been 
discriminated against at work, while half answered that they were 
harassed.186 Eight percent of respondents reported that they were 
fired from their jobs due to their sexual orientation.187 Twenty-five 
percent said that they were “too afraid to apply for certain jobs or 
to specific employers.”188 There is support for such fear. For 
example, up until recently, Italy considered homosexuals as being 
“unfit” to serve in the military.189 
 184. JAMES OUTTZ, ADVERSE IMPACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL 
STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES SELECTION (Psychology Press 2010).  
 
 185. See, e.g., Gill Valentine, An Equal Place to Work? Anti-Lesbian 
Discrimination and Sexual Citizenship in the European Union in Women of the 
European Union: The Politics of Work and Daily Life 111, 112 (Maria Dolors 
García-Ramon & Janice J. Monk eds., Routledge 1996). 
 186. Id. at 112. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 113. 
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Since the implementation of the Directive, Member State 
citizens have taken advantage of its legal provisions. In 2007, 
official statistics by the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights were released.190 The following countries’ courts made 
findings of discrimination based on the “total number of 
complaints in each country.”191 In Sweden, sixty-two cases of 
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace were filed, with 
a result in six instances of proven discrimination.192 In Latvia, 
there were twelve cases filed and only one case resulted in a 
finding of sexual orientation discrimination. In the Czech 
Republic, there was only one case of sexual orientation 
discrimination filed, and discrimination was found in that sole 
case.193 It is important to point out that in Great Britain, the highest 
monetary remedy for a victim of sexual orientation discrimination 
in the workplace was £120,000.194 Unfortunately, these statistics 
also revealed the prevalence of discrimination post-Directive. For 
instance, France reported sixteen percent of individuals were 
discriminated against in the workplace. In the United Kingdom, 
that number is fifty two percent (more than triple in comparison to 
France). In Sweden, thirty percent reported such instances of 
discrimination.195  
Respondents replied to a survey conducted by the European 
Commission.196 The respondents stated that if a “company can 
 190. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia and 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU 
member states: part II—the social situation (updated version) 56 (2009), 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/397-FRA_hdgso_report_part2 
_en.pdf (last visited March 31, 2014). 
 191. Id. at 60.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. STEFAN GRÖSCHL, DIVERSITY IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Gower Pub. 2011). 
 195. Id. at 64. 
 196. Special Eurobarometer 263, Discrimination in the European Union 3, 
18-20 (European Commission, 2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_263_en.pdf (last visited 
March 31, 2013).  
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choose between two candidates with equal skills and 
qualifications,” a sexual orientation minority would be at a 
nineteen percent hiring disadvantage.197 Forty-three percent 
responded that they would be either as likely or more likely to 
grant a promotion to a sexual orientation minority.198 Furthermore, 
sixty-six percent responded that they are in favor of adopting 
“measures that provide equal opportunities” to sexual orientation 
minorities in the “field of employment.”199 The above statistics 
indicate that, while sexual orientation discrimination is not as 
prevalent and blatant as before the implementation of the 
Directive, there is still work to be done. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Not all discrimination is based on a refusal to grant a surviving 
same-sex partner a pension or insurance benefit. Most 
discrimination in the workplace deals with a hostile environment 
from either co-workers or superiors. Studies have shown that 
LGBT experience harassment and discrimination—direct and 
indirect—in the workplace.200 This impacts an individual’s 
decision to be either openly gay in the workplace or become an 
invisible citizen.201 Sexual minorities should not be forced to 
accept such a choice.202 Based on the above analysis and 
discussion, the following are practical and feasible 
recommendations.  
First, with any aspect of life, education should be in the 
forefront of a successful implementation of this Directive. 
 197. Id. at 18.  
 198. Id. at 19. 
 199. Id. at 20. 
 200. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 190, at 
63. 
 201. Id. at 67. 
 202. Id. (“Many workplaces are currently not considered ‘safe havens’ for 
LGBT staff. Although data varies according to national context, studies and 
interviews with National Equality Bodies and LGBT NGOs demonstrate that the 
majority of LGBT persons are generally reluctant, or somewhat reluctant, to 
being ‘out’ and open in the workplace”). 
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Currently, only Sweden has a body specifically authorized to deal 
with discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.203 That body 
is the HomO, one of four Equality Ombudspersons in Sweden.204 
More Member States should raise awareness and educate their 
citizenry about this issue. Furthermore, it is essential that 
employers develop training programs focused on educating 
workplace personnel from the very top management to the 
employees. 
Next, it is recommended that the Member States offer 
incentives to employers who take action in the effort to combat 
sexual orientation discrimination. This will provide sexual 
orientation minorities with hiring and promotional opportunities 
that would not have otherwise been available. As noted above, the 
European Commission has conducted surveys and studies into the 
prevalence of sexual orientation discrimination. The European 
Commission should work on developing a system that focuses on 
creating a mandatory reporting system for statistical data in order 
to gauge the progress of the Directive.  
Lastly, it seems that the national courts and the ECJ are 
interpreting the Directive in a way that is favorable towards same-
sex partnerships. Looking onward, this trend should continue, as 
the Member States and individual companies, such as the VddB, 
would be less inclined to implement provisions that would have a 
discriminatory effect on sexual orientation minorities in the EU. 
While recognizing that this is a brave recommendation, Member 
States that want to grant same-sex partnerships should be 
mandated to create such a scheme, whereby same-sex partnerships 
would be recognized as comparable to marriage for the purpose of 
securing employment benefits, among other things. It could be 
possible, however, that mandating Member States to provide 
comparability status would generate resistance to granting any 
recognition of same-sex partnership rights. While this might be the 
 203. Id. at 58. 
 204. Id.  
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case, Member States who do intend to recognize such status but 
refuse to confer the benefits of such status create comparability in 
name only, thereby rendering it ineffective. This contradicts the 
essence of the recognition of same-sex partnerships, unions, or 
marriages. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is true that laws aimed at combating sexual orientation 
discrimination in the workplace are a fairly new concept. However, 
the EU has come a long way since the non-binding provisions of 
the Parliamentary Resolution. Perhaps a comprehensive Directive 
that focuses on sexual orientation minorities’ rights in all aspects 
of life (subject to the competence limitations of EU institutions) 
would be the next step. There is not much an EU Directive can do 
in regards to the recommendations made above, except that the 
Member States would have to raise their standards, while also 
granting a comparable situation to married spouses. Another option 
would be for the EU to move towards a model of federalism, 
which will allow the EU more discretion in implementing anti-
discriminatory laws. Concededly, this is an ambitious goal, since 
there have been debates about a federal EU, but the model was 
rejected.205 Until further reconsideration, the progress of the EU in 
implementing Directive 2000/78/EC should be commended. 
 205. See supra Part IV.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
